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Abstract: 
Autobiography is a distinctive and valuable kind of reasoning towards ethical 
knowledge. But how can autobiography be ethical reasoning? I distinguish four 
ways in which autobiography can be merely involved in reasoning: as clue to 
authorial intentions; as container for conventional reasoning; as historical 
data; and as thought experiment. I then show how autobiography can itself be 
reasoning by investigating its generic form. Autobiographies are particular, 
enabling vivid display of and education in value-suffused perception. They 
are diachronic, enabling critique by ironic contrast. And they are compositional, 
enabling sense-making by placing in a temporal structure. But these features 
don’t distinguish autobiographies from novels. Should we therefore accept a 
deflationary account of a fourth generic feature of autobiographies, that they 
are self-reflective? I instead pursue a more ambitious account of self-reflection 
and the distinctively autobiographical reasoning it enables, involving a 
realism constraint, a reflexive explanation constraint, and unique address to 
first-person problems of the self. I conclude with an interpretation of an 
example work of autobiographical reasoning, Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of 
George Sherston, against the idea that self-owning is necessary to the good 
human life.  
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Introduction 
Autobiography is a distinctive and valuable kind of reasoning towards ethical 
knowledge. We can rationally learn something about ourselves, as human 
beings and as individuals who find ourselves in a world suffused with value 
and its demands, by reading and thinking through this particular kind of text. 
Autobiographies educate, rather than merely proselytizing or manipulating, 
about ethics, and they are therefore an important but underused resource for 
moral philosophy. 
Call this view rationalism about autobiography. But how can autobiography be 
reasoning? Why be a rationalist about autobiography? I answer in two parts. 
First, I work by contrast: I describe various ways in which autobiographies 
can be involved in reasoning, in order to pick out the distinctive way in which 
they enact a form of reasoning in themselves. Second, I give an account of that 
form of reasoning by investigating the formal features of the autobiography 
as a genre, partly by comparison and contrast with two other literary genres, 
the novel and the biography.  
I will be asked: what do you mean by reasoning and by ethical here? My full 
answer to that question is the account of autobiography as ethical reasoning 
which I develop in the body of the paper, but I will make some initial 
attention-focusing remarks.  
Reasoning is engagement in any of various social practices with three basic 
features. First, they involve change in belief, desire, feeling, or action. Second, 
they have standards of correctness, such that at minimum the ideas of being 
reason-guided, and of improvement—change for the better—in belief, desire, 
feeling, or action, apply [1]. And third, those engaging in them both perform 
as, and address themselves to, active, responsive fellow reasoners, not just 
passive listeners. Because reasoning is social, any one reasoner’s engagement 
in it is always incomplete, inviting response.  
Social practices of reasoning include formal debate; writing and publishing; 
speech-giving; reading with pencil in hand; attending lectures and taking part 
in seminars; listening to testimony; trying out new identities, rituals, and 
situations; pursuing topics through Wikipedia; arguing in pubs and coffee 
shops.  
The typical activities these practices involve include—and this is an equally 
incomplete list—deduction; induction; inference to the best explanation; 
making distinctions; making comparisons and contrasts; telling stories and 
jokes; asserting and checking facts; forks; reductios; redirecting attention; 
identifying new questions; satire; utopian construction.  
Change in belief, desire, feeling, or action can come about in non-reason-
guided ways, so not everything is reasoning: compare threats, mere rhetoric, 
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or mechanical manipulation of affect and disposition [2]. But there are many 
kinds of reasoning, because there are many ways of appealing to reasons, as 
above, and many kinds of reasons to which one can appeal: particular and 
general facts; affectual and perceptual reactions; second-order reasons such as 
reasons to take other reasons as more or less weighty; reasons of ‘thin’ 
rationality such as consistency within the systems of beliefs and of desires, 
and in the relation of both to actions [3]; procedural reasons [4]. 
The ethical is the domain of Socrates’s question—how should one live?  [5]—
and of its surrounding problems, traditionally including such interconnected 
questions as: What am I? Who am I? Why did I do what I did? Did I do the 
right or rational thing? What should I do now, or with the rest of my life? 
What is good? Has my life gone well? What should I become, and how? What 
does my life mean, if it means anything? Can I make it meaningful? Am I the 
owner of my life, or am I alienated from it? Do I live under my own 
command, or am I just the victim of circumstance? Does my life hang together 
as a whole? What changes can I survive?  
There is no problem about autobiographies being concerned with these wide-
sense ethical questions: consider John Stuart Mill’s investigation of his own 
unhappiness in the context of human flourishing [6]; or Tim O’Brien’s attempt 
to understand why he went to fight as a draftee in Vietnam instead of 
deserting; or Doris Lessing’s account of her decision to leave her children 
behind in Rhodesia and come to England to be a novelist. 
The harder question is: do these and other autobiographies address these 
questions by reasoning about them, or in some other way? I now develop an 
account of what autobiographies do which shows that and how they reason. 
The first part of that argument describes some ways in which autobiography 
can be involved in reasoning, as contrastive boundary-markers to the positive 
account of autobiographical reasoning I go on to develop. 
Autobiography as clue and as container 
My first contrast case is autobiography as clue. Thinkers’ autobiographies could 
offer clues for interpreters of their ‘official’ thought. Reading Mill’s 
Autobiography on his mental crisis and recovery could help us to understand 
his account of happiness in Utilitarianism [9]. Richard Wollheim’s memoir 
Germs could help us understand his William James lectures The Thread of Life 
[10]. This is potentially interesting, but it is not autobiography as reasoning: it’s 
autobiography as a way of helping us to motivate and choose between 
interpretations of reasoning done elsewhere. 
My second contrast case is autobiography as container. The autobiographies of 
some philosophers—Collingwood’s An Autobiography, for example [11]—
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contain explicit reasoning of the kind a treatise in philosophy might, but 
wrapped in an autobiographical narrative for cosmetic, historical, or other 
purposes. Such reasoning in autobiographies requires no special treatment: 
we could read the philosophical parts of Collingwood’s autobiography as 
we’d read any other work of philosophy. Perhaps that reading should be 
contextual rather than purely textual, but if it should, it should for reasons 
which apply across the board, not just to autobiographies. This again isn’t 
autobiography as reasoning. It’s addressing a text presented as an 
autobiography as two distinct things: the reasoning, and the life-story which 
contains it, and which can be disposed of like the wrapper round chocolate. 
Autobiography as historical data 
My third contrast case is autobiography as historical data: as information about 
past lives on a par with other textual sources. This is problematic, because 
autobiographies are terrible data: they’re not transparent windows through 
which we observe the facts of an autobiographer’s life, but highly-motivated 
interpretations of that life, replete with bias, partiality, individual perspective, 
and all the general unreliabilities of memory worsened by the pressure to 
defend one’s self-concept against one’s failures and out-of-character 
moments.  
But perhaps this worry is overstated. In the mass and in the context of other 
data, autobiographies are no worse than other historical evidence, and 
historians have developed techniques to deal with such problems. For one 
example of this use of autobiography, Jonathan Rose uses large numbers of 
mostly-unpublished memoirs from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, 
together with library records and the minutes of self-improvement societies 
and workingmen’s institutes, to uncover the history of British working class 
self-help and autodidacticism [12]. But this is again autobiography used in 
reasoning rather than autobiography as reasoning: the reasoning picked out 
here is going on in the analysis of trends in the mass, not in the data in which 
those trends are found. 
Autobiography as thought experiment 
My fourth contrast case is autobiography as thought experiment, or as source 
material for thought experiments. Philosophers could use autobiographical 
narratives in the places and ways we currently use invented or fictionalized 
examples. Take as an example Bernard Williams’s account of Paul Gauguin’s 
abandonment of his family to pursue his art [13], which, as Williams is clear, 
makes no claim to historical accuracy [14]. We could make the same argument 
about moral luck if we replaced this example with Lessing’s autobiographical 
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account, already mentioned, of leaving her children to pursue her ambition to 
be a novelist. 
The canonical role for thought experiments is in attempts at analysis: propose 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper application of some 
concept; test and refine it with apparent counter-examples; aim at reflective 
equilibrium between the general analysis and particular cases [15]. But there 
is no advantage for this project in replacing Williams’s Gauguin with 
Lessing’s Lessing, nor in general in using autobiographical rather than 
fictional examples. And there is the disadvantage that if we did so, we would 
be unable to tweak our counter-examples to put pressure on the precise 
conditions of interest, without heading in the direction of invention anyway. 
Why spend time looking through autobiographies for a good counter-
example, when we could just make one up, or just modify the one we have 
without regard to historical truth? If what’s in question is whether our 
analysis correctly defines the borders of usage, whether the test cases are 
hypothetical or not is in itself irrelevant. If the test case is a very long way 
from the ordinary cases of use, there is a worry whether our intuitions can get 
any purchase. But this is a problem about strangeness, not about accuracy: we 
can describe many untrue but ordinary cases, and identify real cases where 
intuition is silent or confused. 
However, thought experiments can be understood more broadly as exemplary 
stories, used for the various purposes stories are used for in ordinary 
discussion: to make something vivid, to dramatize a problem, to gain a 
sympathetic hearing, to get a laugh, as a mnemonic, to focus on some features 
of a situation and push others out of the limelight, to remind people of 
something they already believe, to make a generalization concrete, to give 
some plausibility to a surprising claim, to draw the reader’s attention to their 
own psychology (as in many of Hume’s exemplary stories), to provoke self-
experimentation in the reader, to render the ordinary alien (as in satire and 
the anthropological exotic). 
Autobiographies can provide starting places for such exemplary stories, but 
in general they’re not ideal for these roles, for two reasons. First, they are 
under-schematized: just because of their detail and complexity, arising from the 
detail and complexity of actual lives, they are less good at the narrowly-
directed work of dramatizing and spotlighting. Consider the way that an 
autobiographical story told and retold for persuasive purposes—by a 
politician, for example—tends to be honed into a schematized anecdote by the 
pressure of use. Second, they are partly constrained by a requirement of 
realism (to which I return later), where thought experiments’ work is often 
helped by their being hypothetical. Both of these features of autobiographies 
therefore pull against the typical uses of thought experiments understood 
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broadly as exemplary stories. So, thought experiment isn’t the distinctive kind 
of reasoning I want to pick out in autobiography. 
Form enables reasoning 
I now argue that autobiographies enact a distinctively autobiographical style 
of reasoning through their generic form. Autobiographical texts’ formal 
features enable authors to do distinctive things with them, just as the formal 
features of other genres of writing enable authors to do different things with 
them. For example, the dialogue—more canonical in Western and in Indian 
philosophy than the autobiography—variously enables self-concealment, 
taming opponents by straw-manning them, self-effacement, self-revelation, 
and the dramatization of moral and political ideals [17]. The now-standard 
treatise enables a distinctive professional rigour and explicitness, and an 
engagement in philosophy as Kuhnian normal science, with shared problems, 
agreed methods, and a productive division of labour. 
The paradigmatic autobiographical form, in contrast to these other forms, is 
particular diachronic compositional self-reflection. I describe these four features 
and the reasoning they enable individually. This breaking up into separate 
formal features and what reasoning they can do is artificial: autobiographies 
don’t typically do one of these things and then later another, but reason using 
all of their formal resources at once. But dismantling the mechanism will help 
to see how it works. My running example in explaining how these features 
enable reasoning is Siegfried Sassoon’s autobiographical trilogy Memoirs of a 
Fox-Hunting Man, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, and Sherston’s Progress, which 
I’ll bring in as I need it. 
Particular reasoning 
Autobiography is about particulars: individual people, the things they do, the 
things which happen to them, the contexts they find themselves in, what their 
experiences do to them; Sassoon, his doubts and decisions, his friends and 
mentors, his war experience. These vividly display complex value-laden 
perceptions of a world filled with the good and bad, right and wrong, 
pleasing and unpleasing, beautiful and ugly, awe-inspiring and contemptible, 
respected and despised, loved and hated. Sassoon, in Memoirs of a Fox-
Hunting Man, brings his prewar world to life with exceptional clarity and 
emotional grip.  
How is this reasoning? It displays, and draws the reader into, perceiving 
value; and by doing so it educates sensibility. This is not deductive reasoning, 
but it does give reasons, by showing and by attempting to help the reader to 
see. If we’re reasoning about the value of something, we can appeal to 
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consistency with other value judgements, but I can’t demonstratively argue 
you into enjoying or being awed by something that you don’t or aren’t: all I 
can do is direct your attention in what I hope is the right time and context. I 
could play you John Coltrane’s Ascension as a way of initiating you into free 
jazz. You could take me up Loughrigg Fell on a clear day as a way of helping 
me to fall in love with the Lake District. Of course these attempts to provide 
reasons for attitudes can fail: an audience may be unmoved this time or ever, 
and will sometimes be right to be unmoved. But all that is true of other kinds 
of reasoning too. 
Sassoon attempts to give us reason to value the life he describes—to see it as 
good and as containing goods. For me in particular as his audience, he 
succeeds in doing what I wouldn’t have thought possible: getting me to see 
fox-hunting as having some good in it, at least in the joyful skill in cross-
country riding which it involves (a good which doesn’t outweigh the bads of 
its cruelty and class snobbery).  
How does the display of value in the particular address my three basic 
features of reasoning? There is change here in the development of perceptual 
sensibility. There is a standard of correctness in the idea that vivid display can 
be an education of that sensibility, such that we can come to see better, to be 
more competent judges of value. And there is invitation to respond in that 
educational encounter. 
Diachronic reasoning 
Autobiography is diachronic. It looks back from one time to a sequence of 
events over the extended past. An autobiographer as narrator turns her 
attention on her own historical past, as distinct from attending to herself now. 
This move offers critical perspective through self-doubling, by opening an 
ironic gap between a narrator’s and a protagonist’s perception and 
understanding. Sassoon’s autobiography takes up that ironic perspective, 
from his position writing after fighting in the trenches, on his innocent 
younger self, who has no idea of what’s going to happen to him, of what 
losses he can suffer, or of the cruelty and stupidity which is hidden in his 
prelapsarian world, about to be revealed. 
How is this reasoning? It is critique by contrast, as also used, for example, in 
satire and in utopian texts [21]. It sets up a dialectic between perspectives, but 
not equal perspectives—not just ‘you see it one way, I see it another’—because 
the narrator’s perspective is later and was partly produced by the earlier 
protagonist, and there is therefore potential for argumentative movement 
towards seeing better. This allows for the past actions and events described in 
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the autobiography to be set against ideals, norms, or at least improved 
understandings. 
Sassoon ironizes his own naïve failure to grasp himself, his world, and their 
fragility in the face of war, and by doing so gives us reason to think 
differently about our own degree of self-knowledge and about our own 
uncontrolled vulnerability to circumstance. In Memoirs of an Infantry Officer in 
particular, Sassoon maps his gradual shift towards revolt against the war by 
moving backwards and forwards between reinhabiting his perspective at the 
time and taking up an external perspective on it. 
How does diachronic critique address my three basic features of reasoning? 
There is change here in drawing us as audience along with a development 
over time, by displaying the contrast between an original and an improved 
understanding, and change in our own understanding of a protagonist by 
showing a later perspective on that protagonist. There is a standard of 
correctness in the possibility of seeing not just differently, but better: by 
gaining the later perspective, we learn something not grasped by the 
protagonist at the earlier time. And there is invitation to respond in the 
opportunity to inhabit the perspectives of narrator and of protagonist, and 
thereby to learn also to distance ourselves from, and to criticize by contrast, 
our own earlier selves. 
Compositional reasoning 
Autobiography is compositional: it places its actions and events in a temporal 
whole, showing them as parts of a complex structure with an overall shape, 
and thereby explaining or making sense of them. An autobiography is 
paradigmatically the story of a life understood as a whole, not merely a 
chronicle of its temporal parts. The structure through which Sassoon makes 
sense of his life is from innocence to experience. In that he is like many other 
soldier autobiographers: the idea of battlefield education or combat epiphany is a 
common trope in modern military memoirs [22]. 
How is composition reasoning? It makes sense of individual actions and 
events by locating them in a larger structure. Causal explanation is one case—
we make sense of something by explaining how it came about—but we can 
also make sense, in autobiographies, by appeal to agents’ reasons (if those are 
different from causes) and by appeal to the meaning of individual actions and 
events in relation to one another and to an overarching purpose or 
significance. Sassoon does not merely report a transition from innocence to 
experience over his lifetime: he makes sense of himself and of what happened 
to him by understanding individual actions and events as parts of that 
innocence-to-experience structure. 
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We should note here that the compositional shape uncovered in or given to a 
life by an autobiography need not be a narrative shape, or at least that 
narrative shape need not do any sense-making work. Autobiographies are 
typically narratives in the thin sense that they are tellings of connected 
temporal sequences of actions and events. But this is a fairly trivial feature: 
many autobiographies have compositional shapes which are much richer and 
more particular than narrative’s generic shapes, and which require an actual 
structure—the growth of some distinctive potential into its expression, for 
example—not just its telling. That structure is obviously narratable—or one 
couldn’t write an autobiography about it—but being the content of a narrative 
is not the same thing as being a narrative. Autobiographers make sense of 
their lives not just by narrating them, but by appeal to the particular temporal 
structures in and circumstances of those lives, which they narrate. 
How does compositional sense-making address my three basic features of 
reasoning? There is change here in coming to see discrete events as cohering in 
a larger structure, and thereby as explained, made sense of, or made 
meaningful. There is a standard of correctness in the question whether that 
structure does explain: does it successfully make sense of the events it 
composes? And there is invitation to respond in the open expectation of 
alternative explanations and attempts at sense-making (perhaps Sassoon’s life 
could be better understood in other terms, for example those offered by his 
various biographers [23]); and even in the possible challenge that no sense can 
be found in the life (perhaps Sassoon’s life is nothing more than a jumble of 
events). 
An objection: autobiographies are just novels 
At this point I need to deal with an objection: so far, nothing I’ve said 
distinguishes autobiographies from novels, nor the ethical reasoning of 
autobiographies from the ethical reasoning of novels. Consider James’s The 
Golden Bowl as interpreted by Martha Nussbaum [24]. It displays value-laden 
particulars. It takes up an ironic and critical perspective on its characters: 
James as narrator tells the reader much more than any one character sees, and 
he criticizes Maggie Verver in the early part of the novel as childish, 
puritanical, and imperceptive. It composes actions and events into a whole: 
the novel is Maggie’s bildungsroman. What makes the difference, if there is 
one, is the final generic feature of autobiography which I want to pick out: 
self-reflection. Autobiographies are works of reflective attention. The 
autobiographer takes up a multiplied but self-referential point of view, 
turning her attention as subject on herself as object. 
One deflationary line to take here is that there is no important difference 
between autobiographies and novels. Autobiography is just a sub-genre of the 
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novel, and any novel could do autobiography’s work in reasoning [25]. And 
in fact I have been deliberately slightly misleading about Sassoon’s 
‘autobiography’: it could equally be called his trilogy of novels about a 
protagonist called ‘George Sherston’. They’re written in an intimate first-
personal voice, and Sherston’s life is very like (although not identical with) 
Sassoon’s, but they’re only ambiguously autobiography. 
The easy thought for me is that yes, a novel could do this work—to the extent 
that it has the paradigmatic autobiographical form of particular diachronic 
composition plus the formal structure of self-reflection. On this line of thought, 
‘self-reflection’ does not require metaphysical identity between author, 
narrator, and protagonist, but only the adoption of the literary devices of first-
personal voice and free indirect style: sympathetic but distanced examination 
of the protagonist which moves subtly between inhabiting her internal 
perspective and adopting an external perspective on her [26]. So, Memoirs of a 
Fox-Hunting Man begins ‘My childhood was a queer and not altogether happy 
one. Circumstances conspired to make me shy and solitary. My father and 
mother died before I was capable of remembering them. I was an only child, 
entrusted to the care of an unmarried aunt who lived quietly in the country’ 
[27]. And in the same form, Great Expectations begins ‘My father’s family name 
being Pirrip, and my christian name Philip, my infant tongue could make of 
both names nothing longer or more explicit than Pip. So I called myself Pip, 
and came to be called Pip. I give Pirrip as my father’s name, on the authority 
of his tombstone and my sister—Mrs Joe Gargery, who married the 
blacksmith’ [28].  
It’s not an accident that novels and autobiographies have such similar forms 
and can therefore do such similar work: the two traditions have the same 
prehistory. Early novels were presented as memoirs or confessions. The fuller 
title of Robinson Crusoe is The Life of Robinson Crusoe, of York, Mariner… Written 
by Himself, for example, and Defoe presents Crusoe’s story as a true 
confession rather than a fiction. 
On this line of thought, there’s no need to be concerned with marking 
boundaries between an autobiography, an autobiographical novel, and an 
ordinarily fictional novel, and ambiguous cases like Sassoon’s are 
unproblematic. The extent to which some text is autobiographical is just a 
matter of the degree to which it adopts a particular literary style. 
Self-reflective reasoning 
Rather than take this easy route, I do want to argue that autobiography is 
distinctive, in three ways arising out of its self-reflective form. 
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First, and as already mentioned, autobiographies have a realism constraint: 
they are supposed to be sensitive to what actually happened in a way novels 
need not be. Autobiography is self-reflection, the self-reflective author is real, 
and she really has a life in which some things happened and others did not. 
Of course, not all autobiographies live up to this demand. For example, James 
Frey’s A Million Little Pieces is a failed self-reflection: Frey not only 
fictionalized his experience by making his protagonist’s life different in 
specific ways from his own—which might have been a useful tactic for self-
reflection, as for Sassoon—but fictionalized it in a deeply clichéd, and 
therefore insensitive to reality and unrevealing way [29]. The problem with 
Frey’s ‘memoir’ is not merely that it does not accurately represent the facts of 
his life, it’s that the specific misrepresentations only obscure Frey’s 
particularity, replacing self-representation and self-interpretation with stock 
forms and characters: the macho substitute father, the damaged but sexy 
angel, the sinner’s redemption [30]. 
How is this reasoning? It adds weight to any lessons about human ethical life 
we take from autobiographies over such lessons from novels (or from failed 
autobiographies), because how we imagine human ethical life is systematically 
distorted and infested with myths like the ones which vitiate Frey’s attempt at 
self-knowledge. That is, the realism constraint on autobiographies, together 
with the ordinary epistemic reasons we have for believing or not believing 
their protestations of accuracy, provide second-order reasons for weighing 
reasons in particular ways. 
This constraint distinguishes autobiographies from novels, but not from 
biographies. We could say that an autobiographer does not have a special kind 
of access to her own life, just—normally—a more capacious access than other 
potential narrators of it [31]. Autobiographical reports are not special: 
autobiography is a reflectively-styled sub-type of life-writing, not 
fundamentally distinct from biography. Richard Holmes deploys the same 
skills he used as a biographer of Coleridge and Shelley to investigate himself 
in his memoir Footsteps [32]. 
If I do not have a privileged kind of access to my own life, unavailable to 
others, then someone else might be able to give a better account of my life 
than I could myself. Perhaps this biographer has information or capacities 
that I lack: Oliver Sacks can tell more about his amnesiac patients than they 
can tell about themselves [33]. Perhaps the biographer is better able to make 
sense of the causal processes of my life than I am competent to, or can bear to. 
Angus Wilson’s The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling explains Kipling far better 
than Kipling himself managed [34]. But there is reason to distinguish 
autobiographies from biographies. 
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Second, autobiographies have a reflexive explanation constraint: the person who 
takes up the reflexive stance was made by the history she describes. The 
protagonist of an autobiography isn’t just grammatically identical with its 
narrator, she actually turned into that narrator and into the author who 
performs both protagonist and narrator. She is investigating the enabling 
conditions of her own activity. The autobiographical narrator can be ironically 
separated from the protagonist, because we can be so separated from our past 
selves, but can’t be completely other than the protagonist. There has to be a 
line of explanation from protagonist to narrator and to that narrator’s ability 
self-reflectively to understand and narrate her life. To see this point in its 
crudest form, imagine an ‘autobiography’ in which the protagonist ‘I’ dies in 
the second chapter.  
How is this reasoning? It constrains the composition of autobiography 
compared with the composition of biographies as well as novels, because 
what happens to the protagonist has to be able to explain the narrator who 
reflects on her. That is, again, this constraint provides second-order reasons 
for re-weighing reasons. 
The third way in which autobiographies are distinctive is not a constraint, but 
an opportunity. Autobiographical self-reflection enables reasoning about 
questions of the autobiographer’s self-knowledge: her particular self, its 
particular good, and her relations to herself over time. These are the wide-sense 
ethical questions I noted at the start—What am I? Who am I? Why did I do 
what I did? Did I do the right or rational thing? and so on—given a 
distinctively first-personal, reflective sense. We could call them the first-person 
problems of the self.  
Autobiography is a distinctively first-personal kind of reasoning about these 
problems of self-knowledge. For one example, some autobiographies 
investigate how to discover, take on, or constitute oneself as a whole rather 
than a mere temporal sequence—or why one can’t so unify or integrate or 
own oneself. This self-reflective reasoning attempts to reconcile, or to give up 
on reconciling, the autobiographer’s first-person perspective now with the 
third-person perspective on the actions and events of her own life extended 
over time. Different autobiographies give different accounts of this whole-life 
unity or its impossibility. Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son argues for 
understanding the unity of his life as given by an underlying developmental 
structure in which latent potential is constrained before being woken and 
expressed. Edwin Muir’s An Autobiography argues for understanding his 
temporal life as an illusion behind which stands the real, timeless self [36]. 
Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior argues against any unification, 
by displaying the multiple identities within, and the multiple connections 
outwards from, her persona as a Chinese-American woman. This is 
reasoning, not something else, because it reveals and offers reasons for 
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understanding selves in the different ways which particular autobiographies 
display. 
Sassoon’s rejection of unity 
I can’t do more here than sketch one example of autobiographical reasoning, 
by returning to Sassoon’s Memoirs. 
Consider the view that the good life for a human being involves self-owning: 
that taking ownership of, or accepting, or endorsing, or taking responsibility for 
one’s life as a whole is necessary for that life’s going well; that being alienated 
from oneself is a threat to the life of flourishing [38]. This is the strong claim 
that such self-owning is at least partly constitutive of living well as a person, 
not just, for example, the weaker instrumental claim that it makes one happier 
to own one’s life (or that the alienated are unhappy) combined with the 
hedonistic claim that the good life is the life of happiness.  
Sassoon’s George Sherston trilogy reasons against this view, by describing and 
enacting three kinds of self-alienation which it presents as necessary to 
Sassoon’s understanding and fully living his life. To own their subjects fully 
would be to falsify his experience and to fail to live his life successfully. 
First, Sassoon focusses on cases of synchronic self-awareness, in which 
consciousness is doubled such that he (masked as George Sherston) observes 
himself in the moment. For example, Sassoon’s account of his spontaneous 
and foolhardy one-man attack on a German trench at Mametz Wood moves 
from singleness—‘all my feelings tightened and contracted to a single 
intention’—to doubledness—‘While I was running I pulled the safety-pin out 
of a Mills’ bomb; my right hand being loaded, I did the same for my left. I 
mention this because I was obliged to extract the second safety-pin with my 
teeth, and the grating sensation reminded me that I was half way across and 
not so reckless as I had been when I started’ [39]. Sassoon’s descriptions of 
others’ battle experience, when he ventriloquizes them, present them as much 
more unified and unselfconscious than his own. But on his own account, 
battle was for him an experience not of owning himself, but of moving 
between being singly present and not under his own rational control in one 
moment, and observing himself from a somewhat distanced perspective the 
next [40]. 
Second, Sassoon focusses on cases of diachronic self-awareness, in which he 
as narrator looks back and comments, often critically, on himself as 
protagonist. For example, Sherston talks to an old friend of his Aunt’s: ‘I even 
went so far as to assert that I wouldn’t have missed this war for anything. It 
brought things home to one somehow, I remarked, frowning portentously as I 
lit my pipe, and forgetting for the moment what a mercy it had been when it 
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brought me home myself’ (IO, pp. 375-6). Sometimes Sassoon makes his ironic 
perspective explicit: ‘What I am writing now is the result of a bird’s-eye view 
of the past’ (IO, p. 378). But this self-separation by time is neither a 
straightforward rejection of identity—narrator and protagonist are not 
different people—nor a straightforward ownership, given Sassoon’s 
distanced amusement and embarrassment at his gauche younger self. 
Third, Sassoon presents Sherston’s and therefore his life as deeply marked by 
a structural disunity. His move from innocence to experience, which I 
described above, is both epistemically and personally transformative [41]. 
Living through a transformative experience provides a kind of knowledge 
only available by first-personal acquaintance. Only a parent knows what it’s 
like for her to have a child; only those who have fought know what combat is 
like for them (the claim is not that nothing can be known third-personally 
about these and other experiences, it’s that not everything can be known that 
way). Second, such an experience is personally transformative. I am a different 
person after becoming a parent; Sassoon is a different person after his baptism 
of fire. Sassoon is therefore in one sense two people rather than one, with a 
transformative break between them. That break is dramatized by the split 
between the prewar idyll of Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man and the war of 
Memoirs of an Infantry Officer. But this is again not a total rejection of identity 
between the innocent and the experienced Sassoon. It is a recognition of the 
possible extent of change in a single life, and a rejection of simple ownership. 
The older Sassoon, changed by the war, can’t straightforwardly own the 
callow young ‘fox-hunting man’, because too much has happened. But the 
older can’t reject the younger entirely either, because the older was made by 
the younger and out of transformative experience. That’s the complexity and 
tension of the relation between first-personal and third-personal perspectives 
on the self which powers and shapes Sassoon’s Memoirs as a whole. 
Beside these three explicit kinds of self-alienation, there is a fourth kind of 
alienation enacted but not described. This is the alienation of those parts of 
Sassoon’s life missing from Memoirs: his parents, poetry, and love life. 
Sherston is brought up by his aunt after being orphaned, but Sassoon was 
brought up by his mother after she and his father were estranged. Sherston 
apparently writes nothing but letters and diary entries, but Sassoon’s war 
poetry—written in the trenches over the period covered by Memoirs of an 
Infantry Officer and in Craiglockhart War Hospital over that covered by 
Sherston’s Progress—made him both famous in his time, and a central figure in 
our default understanding of World War I [42]. Sherston has no love life to 
speak of beyond admiration of simple, single-minded riders and officers, but 
Sassoon was more intimately involved with several of these characters’ real-
life counterparts, and was—some of the time—willing to acknowledge and 
celebrate his homosexuality. What Sassoon chooses not to put into the George 
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Sherston books is indicative of his deep doubledness and the complexity of his 
carefully half-distanced relation to his own life. 
Sassoon’s refusal of straightforward self-owning is reasoning both towards a 
more complex attitude to his own life, and towards a general critique of the 
idea that one could just own oneself outright over a whole life—could have 
one relation of owning to all that one is and has done. That idea is simplistic: 
actual lives are far more complex in their ownerships, identifications, 
distancings, alienations, and rejections, and are not thereby failures.  
This isn’t a conclusive response to the idea of self-owning. But what I am 
trying to show here is that autobiography is ethical reasoning, not that the 
particular reasoning of Memoirs of George Sherston is correct. Defenders of a 
self-owning view can have plenty to say in reply: all I have meant to show is 
that Sassoon’s autobiography engages in reasoning with them and invites 
their reasoned replies. 
Summary 
Summing up: autobiography is ethical reasoning in multiple ways connected 
to its formal features. It reasons about value of various kinds by vivid 
presentation of value-laden particulars. It enacts self-criticism and aims at 
self-knowledge through ironic self-separation. It makes sense of the sequence 
of actions and events which makes up a whole life. And, by being self-
reflective in a more than grammatical sense, it constrains its reasoning with 
requirements of realism and reflexive explanation, and it enables reasoning 
about the first-person problems of the self. 
What is at stake in calling this reasoning is that it involves change in belief, 
desire, feeling, or action; that it has standards of correctness, such that the 
ideas of being reason-guided, and of improvement in belief, desire, feeling, or 
action, apply; and that those engaging in it both perform as, and address 
themselves to, active, responsive fellow reasoners. Autobiography’s effects are 
not merely emotional or rhetorical, and autobiographical content is not mere 
material for reasoning done elsewhere. Autobiographical reasoning is 
admittedly not complete or conclusive: it requires interpretation and invites 
challenge, both of which I offer. But in that way it is no different from other 
kinds of reasoning. 
Autobiography, as this distinctive kind of reasoning about human ethical life, 
is therefore an important but underused resource for moral philosophy. 
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